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Abstract
This paper investigates generation of a secret key from a reciprocal wireless channel. In particular
we consider wireless channels that exhibit sparse structure in the wideband regime and the impact of the
sparsity on the secret key capacity. We explore this problem in two steps. First, we study key generation
from a state-dependent discrete memoryless multiple source. The state of source captures the effect of
channel sparsity. Secondly, we consider a wireless channel model that captures channel sparsity and
correlation between the legitimate users’ channel and the eavesdropper’s channel. Such dependency can
significantly reduce the secret key capacity.
According to system delay requirements, two performance measures are considered: (i) ergodic
secret key capacity and (ii) outage probability. We show that in the wideband regime when a white
sounding sequence is adopted, a sparser channel can achieve a higher ergodic secret key rate than a
richer channel can. For outage performance, we show that if the users generate secret keys at a fraction
of the ergodic capacity, the outage probability will decay exponentially in signal bandwidth. Moreover,
a larger exponent is achieved by a richer channel.
Index Terms
Secret key generation, public discussion, reciprocal wireless channel, channel sounding, ergodic
capacity, secrecy outage.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental limit of secret key generation from discrete memoryless multiple source
(DMMS) is developed by Ahlswede, Csisza´r [1] and Maurer [2]. Their results show that if
X, Y, Z (respectively observed by Alice, Bob and Eve) are correlated with a known distribution,
it is possible to generate a secret key between Alice and Bob at a positive rate through use of
a public discussion. The resulting information rate leaked to Eve can be made arbitrarily small.
The supremum of achievable secret key rates is called the secret key capacity.
Since their work, there have been many extensions to explore the secret key capacity of more
complicated models. In [3, 4], users observe DMMS and also transmit information via wiretap
channel [5], but there is no access to public channel for discussion. The authors in [6–9] consider
a wiretap channel influenced by a random channel state, known by one (or both) of the legitimate
users. In such models, the random channel state can be viewed as a kind of correlated source
shared by transmitter/receiver which also influences the transmission.
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2In [10, 11], key generation from DMMS is considered where the DMMS is excited by a
deterministic source [10] or by a random source [11]. This sender-excited model is motivated by
an application in which key generation is based on the inherent randomness of reciprocal wireless
channel. Consider a situation where Alice and Bob transmit a sounding signal to each other over
a reciprocal wireless channel. Due to the channel reciprocity, Alice and Bob observe a pair of
correlated sources. The source turns out to be a good source for secret key generation because
it can be the case that (i) the source is correlated, (ii) the source is ubiquitous since it is from
wireless channel, and (iii) it is hard to eavesdrop because the wireless channel varies quickly in
the spatial and temporal domains. This issue has received much attention in terms of theoretical
and practical research [12–19]. However, most of this work is subject to the assumption that
the eavesdropper channel is statistically independent of the main channel (the channel between
Alice and Bob). This is true when the environment has rich scattering such that the correlation
between channel coefficients decreases rapidly in the spatial domain.
However, there is growing experimental evidence (e.g., [20–23]) and physical arguments (e.g.,
[24–26]) which show that realistic wireless channels are sparse at large bandwidths. The effect
of channel sparsity on secret key capacity is twofold: (i) it reduces the degrees-of-freedom (DoF)
of the main (Alice-Bob) channel and (ii) it induces spatial correlation [27], thereby increasing
Eve’s ability to observe the main channel.
We revisit the key generation problem when the channel exhibits sparsity in the wideband
regime. This channel characteristic can be captured by a sparsity pattern that defines the non-zero
support of the channel coefficients. Depending on the environment, the sparsity pattern could
experience fast or slow time variations. The channel model also captures the correlation between
the main channel and Eve’s observations. To study secret key generation in this context we capture
these characteristics by defining a state-dependent discrete multiple memoryless source (SD-
DMMS). We specialize this model to the statistical characterization of sparse wireless channels
were the sparsity pattern plays a role of the channel state and, as we discuss next, develop
ergodic capacity and secrecy outage results.
In analogy to communication over a fading channel, two regimes are studied according to the
system delay constraint:
• Ergodic regime (the delay tolerant regime): If the key is generated based on a large number
of observations across multiple states, the secret key capacity is well-defined in the Shannon
sense. We call the capacity in this case the ergodic secret key capacity. The main problem
is that the system suffers from an excessive delay.
• Non-ergodic regime (the delay stringent regime): If the observed source sequence is not
long enough or the state changes slowly so that the key generation is forced to occur within
a period of constant state, the capacity is not defined in general. In this case, we consider
the secrecy outage probability which measures the probability that the instantaneous state
condition cannot support the key rate to fulfill the secrecy condition (this will be defined
later).
Secrecy outage is also considered in other research regarding state-dependent (fading) wiretap
channel (e.g., [28, 29]). We show that when a white sounding sequence is adopted in the wideband
(low power) regime, a sparser channel can achieve a higher secret key rate than a richer channel
can. This is analogous to capacity behavior in sparse multi-antenna channels in [30]. Furthermore,
at each signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), there is an adequate bandwidth that maximizes the secret
key rate. For the outage performance, we show that the system can achieve an exponential
decaying outage probability by using an α-backoff scheme (0 < α ≤ 1) in which secret key rate
3is a fraction α of the ergodic capacity. Unlike the ergodic case, now a richer channel always
has a larger exponent characterizing the decay of the outage probability. In a similar vein as
communication over a fading channel, this demonstrates that a large number of DoF helps to
smooth out the effect of the unknown state.
The paper is organized as following. In Section II we give some definitions and describe the
system model. This includes the correlated sparse wireless channel model, the definition of the
SD-DMMS, and the one-way discussion key generation protocol. In Section III, we investigate
the ergodic secret key capacity of SD-DMMS and apply this to key generation from a sparse
wireless channel. Outage is defined in Section IV. We give a necessary and sufficient condition
for an outage event and explore the outage probability when an α-backoff scheme is used.
Detailed proofs are deferred for the Appendix.
II. DEFINITIONS AND SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper we are motivated by key generation based on wireless channel that exhibits
sparsity in the delay domain. We first develop our model of a sparse wireless channel in Section
II-A. While in earlier works on modeling sparse wireless channels, e.g., see [20, 31–35], there is
only a single channel to model, in Section II-A we need to model the main (Alice-to-Bob) channel
as well as Eve’s correlated observations of that main channel. Following our wireless motivations,
in Section II-B we develop an abstracted state-dependent discrete multiple source (SD-DMMS)
model. In this model the “state” captures the effect of the slowly varying sparsity pattern while
the key itself is extracted from the conditionally-generated (conditioned on the sparsity pattern)
channel fades. Finally, in Section II-C the one-way public discussion key generation protocol is
formally presented.
A. Sparse reciprocal wireless channel
Consider a wireless communication system with bandwidth W . Say that the channel exhibits
sparsity in the delay domain1 where τmax is the maximum delay spread of the channel. Then
Lmax = ⌈τmaxW ⌉ is the maximum number of resolvable paths. A sounding sequence d =
[d1, d2, · · · , dNd]T is transmitted over time period T , where Nd = ⌈TW ⌉. The sounding sequence
is a known sequence with power dHd = P . We assume each two-way (Alice ⇆ Bob) sounding
is done within a channel coherence period (i.e., Tcoh ≫ 2T ). Further multiple channel soundings
(indexed by t) are performed within non-overlapping coherence periods meaning that each set
of soundings are independent.
The channel outputs in sounding interval t are
X[t] = DHab[t] +W1[t] (Alice) , (1a)
Y [t] = DHab[t] +W2[t] (Bob) , (1b)
where Hab[t] = (H1[t], · · · , HLmax[t])T is the sampled (virtual) channel coefficient [24, 36]
1In this paper, we consider channel sparsity in the delay domain. It is not difficult to extend the result to the sparsity in either
the Doppler or spatial domains, e.g., [24–26, 35].
4vector, and D is an N-by-Lmax Toeplitz matrix with N = Nd + Lmax − 1:
D =


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.
.
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. dNd
.
.
.
0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 dNd


=
[
d1,d2, · · · ,dNd
]
.
A widely used sounding signal is a sequence whose spectrum is asymptotically white in Nd. In
this case D is a full column-rank matrix such that2
D
H
D
.
= P ILmax (2)
when Nd is sufficiently large. One such example is d =
√
Pe =
√
P (1, 0, · · · , 0)T . Another
such example is pseudo-random (PN) sequence in spread spectrum system [37]. The noise terms
W1[t] and W2[t] in (1) are independent CN (0, σ2aIN) and CN (0, σ2b IN) vectors, respectively.
1) Sparse channel model: Most channels that have a small number of physical paths will
exhibit sparsity in the delay domain as the signal bandwidth W increases. In particular, in some
delay bin ℓ, the corresponding channel coefficient Hℓ[t] will be zero. In this paper, we adopt
the sub-linear law model considered in previous work [34, 35] to capture the sparse channel
characteristic. In this model, the channel is called δ-sparse if the average number of non-zero
channel coefficients scales as
L = (τmaxW )
δ = Lδmax, δ ∈ (0, 1) . (3)
The parameter L is also the mean number of channel DoF.
The channel sparsity pattern of the main channel in sounding interval t is
Sab[t] =
(
Sab,1[t], · · · , Sab,Lmax [t]
)
∈ SLmax ,
where S = {0, 1} and E
[∑Lmax
ℓ=1 Sab,ℓ[t]
]
= L. This pattern defines the support of the channel
vector
Hab[t] =
(
H1[t], H2[t] . . . HLmax[t]
)
,
i.e., Hℓ[t] = 0 if and only if Sab,ℓ[t] = 0. The channel coefficients Hℓ[t] are independent
CN (0, ν2ℓ ) variable where the variance ν2ℓ = 0 if Sab,ℓ[t] = 0. The channel has unit power,
i.e.,
∑
ℓ ν
2
ℓ = 1. Later, we use “channel degrees-of-freedom” (DoF) to refer to the weight of the
realization of the vector Sab[t]. We also call Sab[t] the state of Hab[t]. A rich multipath channel
corresponds to δ → 1.
The sparsity pattern Sab[t] will, in general, be time-varying. However, in most case of interest,
Sab[t] will change much more slowly than the channel coefficients Hab[t]. This is because the
main reflectors, by which paths are resolved by different delay bins, move more slowly than the
phase changes that influencs the fading coefficients [36, 38, 39]. Because of this, most of the
secret key rate will be generated by the randomness inherent to the channel coefficients rather
2Here and in the following, we say g(xn) .= g if g(xn) → g when n is sufficiently large.
5than the sparsity pattern itself. Furthermore, there exists good techniques to estimate the sparsity
pattern reliably based on few observations, e.g., [40]. Thus, we consider Sab[t] known to Alice
and Bob. Let n be the number of channel sounding periods during which the sparsity pattern
remains constant. We term this the sparsity coherence period. Thus, the m-th sparsity coherent
period extends from t = (m− 1)n+ 1 to t = mn. In this interval Sab[t] remains constant, i.e.,
Sab[t] = Sab[mn] for all t, (m−1)n+1 ≤ t ≤ mn. We further assume that Sab[t] is independent
across periods.
Modeling the distribution of the state itself is a difficult task, so we consider a simple model
Pr(Sab,ℓ = 1) =
L
Lmax
= (τmaxW )
−(1−δ) , ρ (4)
for all ℓ. In other words, the Sab,ℓ is Bernoulli distribution with parameter ρ (denoted Bern (ρ)).
2) Eavesdropper’s correlation model: Eve’s channel output is similar to (1)3:
Z[t] = DHe[t] +W3[t] (Eve) , (5)
where the noise is CN (0, σ2eIN). The channel coefficient vector He[t]=(He,1[t], · · · , He,Lmax[t])T
is also δ-sparse with state denoted by Se[t], and each element CN (0, υ2ℓ ) distributed. We model
the correlation between He[t] and Hab[t] in a two-step process as follows:
• Correlation between Se and Sab: For each delay bin ℓ for which Sab,ℓ = 1, the probability
that Eve also has non-zero channel gain is θ. i.e.,
Pr(Se,ℓ = 1|Sab,ℓ = 1) = θ (6)
for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ Lmax.
• Correlation between individual channel coefficient: For those channel coefficients in the
“common support” delay bins, i.e., in the set {ℓ : Sab,ℓ = Se,ℓ = 1}, the correlation
coefficients are
η(Hℓ, He,ℓ) ,
E[HℓH
∗
e,ℓ]√
E[|Hℓ|2]E[|He,ℓ|2]
= η .
The parameter θ captures the fraction of DoF that the main channel and Eve’s channel have
in common. One can think of the relationship between the state (sparsity pattern) of the main
channel and that of the eavesdropper’s observation as a binary memoryless channel. However,
because Eve’s marginal channel has the same δ-sparsity as the main channel (since the users are
in the same environment), the channel is not symmetric. In other words, transition probability
Pr(Se,ℓ = 1|Sab,ℓ = 0) 6= Pr(Se,ℓ = 0|Sab,ℓ = 1). This is illustrated in Figure 1. Finally, the
parameter η captures the effect that the paths (of both channel) located in the common delay
bin shares the same physical scattering.
Remark 1: The parameter space {(θ, η), δ} of our model captures many scenarios of interest.
From a physical aspect, there are two factors effecting Eve’s channel correlation: the distance
between Eve and Bob (which mainly impacts leakage to Eve), and richness/sparseness of the
multipath (which impacts both leakage to Eve and the common randomness between Alice and
Bob). When Eve gets close to Bob, generally, both θ and η will increase (and vice versa);
this will generally increase the leakage. The parameter δ (and thus ρ) controls the maximum
3In order to get meaningful observations, we assume Eve is located close to one of the users. So only one of the two Eve’s
channel outputs during the two-way sounding correlates with the main channel. The other output is independent of the main
channel due to fast spatial decorrelation.
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Fig. 1. Transition probability Pr(Se,ℓ|Sab,ℓ).
number of DoF. When multipath is rich, ρ is high and η is closer to zero (i.e., high overlap but
independent), resulting in the highest capacity and lowest leakage. For sparse multipath, ρ is
lower (lower common randomness) and η could be large even at larger distances between Eve
and Bob. In this case leakage will likely increase more slowly as Eve gets closer to Bob.
To generate a secret key, users repeat the channel sounding (1) (and (5)) nM times and
generate a key based on a pair of super-block {(X[t],Sab[t]), (Y [t],Sab[t])}nMt=1. In the following
section we abstract away the actual sounding process and specify a state-dependent source model
where the state varies more slowly than the underlying source-realization process from which
the key is generated. When we study the ergodic case, we will let both n and M go to infinity,
while when we study the outage case, M = 1, and n can be large.
B. State-dependent discrete memoryless multiple source
To leverage results on information theoretic security, we consider a state-dependent (SD)
DMMS model depicted in Figure 2. The observation triple (XnM , Y nM , ZnM) ∈ X nM ×YnM ×
ZnM is generated according to p(xnM , ynM , znM |sMab , sMe ), conditioning on the pair of length-M
sequences: (sMab , sMe ) ∈ SM × SM .
As discussed in Section II-A, SMab is the state sequence of Alice and Bob’s correlated source
XnM ,Y nM and SMe is the state sequence of Eve’s observation ZnM . The states have joint
distribution p(sMab , sMe ). Since the states vary more slowly than the conditonally-generated sources,
there is a length of time n during which the states remain constant. This correponds to the
sparsity coherence period discussed earlier. A large n means that the states are changing slowly.
We assume that the states are available to the corresponding observers but not to other users. In
other words, Alice and Bob both know Sab but not Se while Eve knows Se but not Sab. This is
depicted in Figure 2. We call the state memoryless if
p(sMab , s
M
e ) =
M∏
m=1
p(sab,m, se,m) . (7)
Similarly, the source is memoryless if
p(xnM ,ynM , znM |sMab , sMe )
=
M∏
m=1
mn∏
i=(m−1)n+1
p(xi, yi, zi|sab,m, se,m) . (8)
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Fig. 2. State-dependent DMMS model
Note that in (8) one see the effect of the sparsity coherence period. The triplet of source samples
(Xi, Yi, Zi) is conditionally and independently generated from the same state pair (Sab,m, Se,m)
for all i, (m − 1)n < i ≤ mn. Each of (Xi, Yi, Zi) stands for the vector of channel output in
II-A.
In the one-way discussion protocol (which will be detailed next in II-C), Alice sends a message
Φ over a public channel. Bob recovers Alice’s key based on his observation (Y nM , SMab ) and Φ.
Eve’s source Z is a degraded version of Y if
p(x, y, z|sab, se) = p(x, y|sab)p(z|y, sab, se) . (9)
In other words, for given states (sab, se), Eve’s output is a cascade of the Bob’s output and a
channel represented by p(z|y, sab, se).
C. One-way discussion key generation protocol
Let K = [1 : 2nR] be the key space. There is an authenticated public channel available to users
to exchange error-free public messages in the set Φ = [1 : 2nRφ]. The one-way public discussion
secret key generation protocol consists of three functions:
f1 : X nM × SM → K , (10a)
g : X nM × SM → Φ , (10b)
f2 : YnM × SM × Φ→ K , (10c)
which define Alice’s key, public message, and Bob’s key, respectively. Namely,
K = f1(X
nM , SMab ) , (11a)
φ = g(XnM , SMab ) , (11b)
Kˆ = f2(Y
nM , SMab , φ) . (11c)
8Definition 1 (Achievability). A secret key rate R is (weakly) achievable if for any ǫ > 0, there
is a secret key generation system defined in (10) such that for sufficient large n and M ,
Pr(K 6= Kˆ) < ǫ , (12)
1
nM
I(K;ZnM , SMe ,Φ) < ǫ , (13)
1
nM
H(K) > R − ǫ . (14)
Condition (14) means the key is almost uniformly distributed over the set K. System secrecy
is measured in terms of the mutual information defined in (13) which says that the information
about the key leaked to eavesdropper is negligible. The supremum of achievable secret key rates
is called the secret key capacity.
III. ERGODIC SECRET KEY CAPACITY
For applications that can tolerate longer delays, the key generation protocol can operate across
a large number of independent state realizations. In this setting n and M can both be arbitrary
large. The secret key capacity in the Shannon sense is well-defined and is termed the ergodic
secret key capacity, Cer.
A. Ergodic Capacity of SD-DMMS
The theorems developed by Ahlswede, Csisza´r [1, Theorem 1] and Maurer [2, Theorem 1,2]
can be applied to the ergodic case of the source model in Figure 2 to get the following lemma.
Lemma 1.
C−er ≤ Cer ≤ C+er , (15)
where
C−er = I(X ; Y |Sab)− I(X ;Z, Se|Sab) +
1
n
H(Sab|Se) (16)
C+er = I(X ; Y |Z, Sab, Se) +
1
n
H(Sab|Se) . (17)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A. 
The important observation about (16) and (17) is that they both consist of two types of terms:
mutual information terms and entropy terms. The latter quantifies the amount of uncertainty in
the sparsity pattern of the main (Alice-to-Bob) channel given Eve’s observation Se. The former
quantifies the conditional secret key capacity given the latter. The following lemma says that the
upper and lower bound equal one another when the eavesdropper’s observation is degraded.
Corollary 2. For the situation in which the eavesdropper’s source is degraded per (9), the
ergodic secret key capacity is
Cer = I(X ; Y |Sab)− I(X ;Z, Se|Sab) + 1
n
H(Sab|Se) . (18)
9Proof: It can be verified by examining (17) that
C+er = I(X ; Y |Z, Sab, Se) +
1
n
H(Sab|Se)
= I(X ; Y, Z, Se|Sab)− I(X ;Z, Se|Sab) + 1
n
H(Sab|Se)
= I(X ; Y |Sab)− I(X ;Z, Se|Sab) + 1
n
H(Sab|Se)
= C−er ,
where the third equality is due to the fact that given Sab we have Markov chain X−Y −(Z, Se).
This holds since the eavesdropper is degraded.
Note that when the state changes slowly, which is equivalent to when n is large, 1
n
H(Sab|Se)→
0. That is, the contribution to the secret key capacity due to the sparsity pattern Sab is very
small. As discussed in Section II-A this will be the common situation. Thus, in following, we
focus on the non-vanishing term of (18), which we denote as Rer, i.e., Rer = I(X ; Y |Sab) −
I(X ;Z, Se|Sab).
B. Ergodic secret key rate of sparse wireless channel
We now first apply Lemma 1 to the sparse channel model specified in II-A. In Section III-B1
we first examine the expressions for mutual information I(X;Y |Sab) and I(X;Z,Se|Sab) for
the vector channel described by (1) and (5). Then, in Section III-B2 we identify conditions
under which the eavesdropper’s observation is degraded. Finally, in Sections III-B3 and III-B4
we focus in on the randomness due to the sparity patterns and analyze the wideband limit.
1) Mutual information: Define Qℓ to be the product Sab,ℓ×Se,ℓ so Qℓ ∈ {0, 1}. Thus Qℓ = 1
if and only if the support (the sparsity pattern) of Hab and of He are both non-zero in the ℓ-th
delay bin. Also define two functions:
Iab(γa, γb) = log
(
(1 + γa)(1 + γb)
1 + γa + γb
)
, (19a)
Ie(γa, γe) = log
(
(1 + γa)(1 + γe)
1 + γaγe(1− |η|2) + γa + γe
)
. (19b)
and γa = Pσ2a , γb =
P
σ2
b
and γe = Pσ2e . We show in Appendix B that
I(X;Y |Sab) = E
[
Lmax∑
ℓ=1
Sab,ℓIab(ν
2
ℓ γa, ν
2
ℓ γb)
]
(20a)
I(X;Z,Se|Sab) = E
[
Lmax∑
ℓ=1
QℓIe(ν
2
ℓ γa, υ
2
ℓγe)
]
(20b)
In the above expressions, the expectation is taken over the random sparsity patterns Sab and Se.
Note the factor Qℓ in (20b). When Sab,ℓ = 1 but Se,ℓ = 0 the eavesdropper has no measurement
of that channel coefficient (Qℓ = 0). Thus, the eavesdropper has no observation of that common
randomness and the negative mutual information term in (16) is zero.
It is clear in (20) that channel sparsity patterns (Sab and Se) effect the mutual information
via the channel DoF (the number of terms in the summation) and the correlation coefficient η
effects the information leakage via Ie(·) in each delay bin observed by the eavesdropper.
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2) Degraded condition: Because the Eve’s channel is correlated to the main channel, she
may get a good estimation of Hab if she has a higher SNR than Alice and Bob. To guarantee
the positivity of the secret key rate, we need to characterize the conditions under which the
eavesdropper has a worse observation than Alice and Bob. To develop such conditions we first
consider a delay bin where Qℓ = 14. Project the channel outputs onto dℓ, the ℓ-th column of D,
we get
Xℓ = d
H
ℓ X
.
= PHℓ +W1,ℓ (21a)
Yℓ = d
H
ℓ Y
.
= PHℓ +W2,ℓ . (21b)
Because the sounding signal is an (asymptotically) white sequence, Xℓ (and Yℓ) are sufficient
statistic for estimating Hℓ. The noise W1,ℓ (resp. W2,ℓ) is a zero mean complex Gaussian with
variance Pσ2a (resp. Pσ2b ). Similarly, Eve’s sufficient static is
Zℓ = d
H
ℓ Z
.
= PHe,ℓ +W3,ℓ
≡ P
(
υℓ
νℓ
ηHℓ +
√
1− |η|2H ′ℓ
)
+W3,ℓ . (22)
Because of η(Hℓ, He,ℓ) = η, we have equivalently written He,ℓ as a sum of two terms. The
first term is a scaled version of Hℓ. The second, H ′ℓ, is a CN (0, υ2ℓ ) random variable that is
independent of Hℓ. We see from (22) that Eve’s observation Zℓ contains two types of noise. The
first is the receiver noise W3,ℓ. The second is due to the uncorrelated H ′ℓ.
Eve’s observation Zℓ will be a degraded version of Yℓ if Eve has a smaller SNR than Bob.
This occurs if
ν2ℓP
σ2b
>
|η|2υ2ℓP
(1− |η|2)υ2ℓP + σ2e
. (23)
Otherwise, Yℓ is a degraded version of Zℓ. If the sounding signal power is small and Eve has a
suitably smaller noise variance σ2e , in particular, when
(1− |η|2)υ2ℓP < |η|2
υ2ℓ
ν2ℓ
σ2b − σ2e , (24)
then Bob’s output is noisier and no secret key can be extracted at a positive rate from the ℓ-th
delay bin. This is because when P is small, Eve’s independent noise (due to H ′ℓ) is decreased.
It is observed in [41] that there is a cutoff SNR below which the secret key capacity is zero. If
ν2ℓ = υ
2
ℓ and all the users (Alice, Bob and Eve) are with the same SNR, i.e., σ2a = σ2b = σ2e = σ2,
the secret key capacity will be positive because Eve has an extra noise (due to the uncorrelated
H ′ℓ).
3) Achievable secret key rate: In order to see the effect of channel sparsity when the bandwidth
is large (but finite), we focus on the equal-SNR case and consider a uniform delay profile, thus,
having a degraded eavesdropper. Define the random number of non-zero channel coefficients in
the main Alice-to-Bob and in Eve’s channel to be, respectively,
Bab =
Lmax∑
ℓ=1
Sab,ℓ , (25a)
Be =
Lmax∑
ℓ=1
Se,ℓ , (25b)
4In subspaces such that Qℓ = 0 either Sab,ℓ = 0 or Eve has no observation of Hab,ℓ, so there is no need to consider those
subspaces.
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Note that Bab and Be are binomial Bino (Lmax, ρ) distributed random variables. Consider a
uniform delay profile, i.e., ν2ℓ = 1Bab for all ℓ for which Sab,ℓ = 1; similarly, υ
2
ℓ =
1
Be
for all ℓ
for which Se,ℓ = 1.
Let Is(P ) be the instantaneous key rate I(X;Y |Sab) − I(X;Z,Se|Sab) for fixed Sab and
Se. i.e.,
Is(γ) = BabIab
(
γ
Bab
,
γ
Bab
)
−BqIe
(
γ
Bab
,
γ
Be
)
, (26)
where γ , P
σ2
and
Bq =
Lmax∑
ℓ=1
Qℓ (the number of overlap delay bins) . (27)
From (20) and Corollary 2 the achievable secret key rate is
Ier(γ) = E [Is(γ)] . (28)
As we will see later in III-B4, Is(γ) is convex in low SNR (and so is Ier(γ)). Thus, a uniform
sounding strategy using a sounding signal with constant power P is not optimal. Let P denote
all sounding policies that satisfy average power constraint E[dHd] ≤ P , we can achieve
Rer(γ) = max
P
Ier(γ) . (29)
Note that from Corollary 2 and the discussion thereafter, Rer(P ) approaches Cer(P ) from the
below as n→∞.
Theorem 3 (An on-off sounding achieves capacity).
Rer(γ) = max
0<λ≤1
λIer
(γ
λ
)
. (30)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
The physical interpretation of the auxiliary variable λ is that key rate λIer
(
γ
λ
)
can be achieved
by an on-off sounding strategy that sounds the channel during λ (0 < λ ≤ 1) fraction of the
time, each with power P
λ
, and does not sound the channel (i.e., is turned off) during the rest of
the time (i.e., a time-sharing scheme). Theorem 3 says that the ergodic secret key capacity can
be achieved by an λ∗ on-off sounding strategy where λ∗ is the argumment maximizing (30). As
we will discuss in III-B4, an optimal on-off signal is sparse in time (i.e., λ∗ → 0) in a low SNR
(γ → 0) and is dense (i.e., λ∗ → 1) in a high SNR.
4) Wideband regime: One way to increase the secret key capacity is to increase the bandwidth
W of the wireless channel. However, the channel DoF do not grow linearly in W . To see how
W effects the secret key rate, we examine Rer(P ) from (30) in the wideband regime.
In this case, each channel DoF is sounded at a low SNR. At low SNR we can approximate
(19) as
Iab(x, x) ≈ x
2
ln 2
, (31a)
Ie(x, y) ≈ |η|
2xy
ln 2
. (31b)
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Fig. 3. Achievable secret key rate Ier(γ) plotted versus SNR (γ). The bandwidth is W =100MHz, the maximum delay spread
τmax = 10µs, the conditional probability of overlap in Sab and Se is θ = 0.5 and the correlation between channel coefficients
is η = 0.1. The sparsity parameter δ ∈ [0.5, 1].
for x and y small. The ergodic key rate
Ier(γ) ≈ 1
ln 2
E
[
Bab
(
γ
Bab
)2
−Bq|η|2 γ
Bab
γ
Be
]
=
γ2
ln 2
E
[
1
Bab
− |η|2 Bq
Bab
1
Be
]
(a)≈ γ
2
ln 2
(1− θ|η|2)
L
=
γ2
ln 2
(1− θ|η|2)
(τmaxW )δ
. (32)
The approximation (a) is accurate when L ≫ 1 [42, eq.(5)]. The right hand side of (32) is a
quadratic function of γ, thus Ier(γ) is convex in low SNR.
Figure 3 plots Ier(γ) versus γ, for a bandwidth of W = 100MHz, τmax = 10µs, and for various
values of the sparsity parameter δ ∈ [0.5, 1]. We see that a sparser channel (small δ) achieves a
higher key rate at low SNRs. We can also observe this from (32). According to Theorem 3 and
notice that (32) is quadratic in γ, we need a sparser signal in time (an on-off signal) to get a
higher key rate. In other words, in the wideband (power-limited) regime, fewer DoF (either in
channel or in time domain) can achieve a higher key rate. This occurs because the key generation
problem is a combined channel sounding and channel coding problem. By focusing energy on
fewer DoF we raise their SNR, enabling key generation to occur at a higher rate. In contrast, a
richer channel (large δ) results in a higher key rate at a high SNR since that is a DoF-limited
(and not a power-limited) regime.
Figure 4(a) and 4(b) plots Ier as a function of W . This provides another view of the tradeoff
between power and DoF. First, let γ be fixed at 10dB. Then, Figure 4(a) plots Ier for different
values of channel sparsity δ in the range [0.5, 1). In the wideband (low-SNR) regime, larger δ
results in a smaller key rate. In Figure 4(b), δ = 0.5 is fixed and γ is varied from 10dB to 30dB.
We see that for each SNR, there is a unique W ∗ that achieves the highest key rate.
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Fig. 4. Achievable secret key rate Ier(γ) for SNR fixed at γ = 10dB plotted versus bandwidth W . In subfigure (a) the tradeoff
is plotted for for values of the sparsity parameter δ ∈ [0.5, 1). In subfigure (b) the sparsity parameter is fixed at δ = 0.5 and
the tradeoff is plotted for four SNRs, γ (dB) ∈ [15, 16].
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE
In contrast to Section III when an application has a stringent delay requirement or when the
state (i.e., the sparsity pattern) changes so slowly that it is roughly constant during the secret
key generation process, the secret key capacity in th Shannon sense is not well-defined. To study
this setting, in this section we set M = 1 while allowing n to be arbitrary large. Since users only
know their state but not Eve’s state, they cannot adapt the key generation rate to Eve’s state.
Thus, satisfying the secrecy condition (13) can be problematic. In this section, we consider an
“outage” setting with a degraded eavesdropper. For any (M = 1) realization (Sab, Se) = (sab, se),
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we say that a secrecy outage occurs if
1
n
I(K;Zn,Φ|sab, se) > Re (33)
for some Re > 0. Namely, there is a non-vanishing information rate leaked to Eve. Let
Cs(sab, se) = I(X ; Y |sab)− I(X ;Z|sab, se) (34)
be the conditional secret key capacity for state (sab, se). Theorem 4 shows that the event
R > Cs(sab, se) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the outage event (33).
Theorem 4. For any rate-R secret key generation systems for which Bob can reliability
recover Xn (i.e., Pr(Xn 6= f2(Y n, sab, φ))→ 0 for some f2(·)), and let
Re(sab, se) = R− Cs(sab, se) > 0, then
(i) the information leaked to Eve is lower bounded as
1
n
I(K;Zn,Φ|sab, se) ≥ Re(sab, se)− 2ǫ , (35)
and
(ii) there exist a coding scheme (cf., (11)) that satisfies (12), (14) and
1
n
I(K;Zn,Φ|sab, se) ≤ Re(sab, se) + 2ǫ . (36)
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix D.
A. Wideband sparse channel
In the reciprocal wireless channel case, we know from III-B that Cs(Sab, Se) = Is(γ) given
in (26). Using the approximations from (31), we have in the wideband regime that
Cs(Sab,Se) ≈ γ
2
ln 2
(
1
Bab
− |η|2 Bq
Bab
1
Be
)
. (37)
Recall that Bab (resp. Be) is the weight of vector Sab (resp. Se) (cf., (25)) and Bq is the weight
of support common to Sab and Se (cf., (27)). Also note that Bab, Be, Bq are random variables
so that the overall quantity in (37) is a random variable. Unfortunately, there is no simple
expression for the distribution of Cs(Sab,Se) in (37). Since the users are assumed to know Sab
(and, therefore, Bab), in order to understand how the channel sparsity effects the probability of
outage, we consider the case where Bab = L (i.e., its mean which is its most likely value) and
Be = L. The only uncertainty at users is Bq, the number of delay bins from which Eve can
learn the key. Conditioned on Bab = L and according to the correlation model in (6), Bq has a
Binomial distribution Bino (L, θ).
From Theorem 4, the outage probability is
Pout = Pr (R > Cs(Sab,Se))
≈ Pr
(
R >
γ2
L ln 2
(
1− |η|2Bq
L
))
= Pr
(
Bq >
1
|η|2
(
1− ln 2LR
γ2
))
, (38)
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where L = (Wτmax)δ. We see that a larger γ (SNR), a larger W , or a smaller η will decrease
the outage probability. However, the sparsity δ changes both the distribution of Bq and the right
hand side of the argument in (38) via L. Thus, it is still not clear how δ impact Pout. When
users don’t know the instantaneous secret key capacity, a conservative strategy is to generate a
key at a smaller rate.
Consider a strategy in which the key is generated at rate R = αIer(γ) (0 < α < 1), i.e., a
backoff from the ergodic key rate (32). We refer to this strategy as the “α-backoff” strategy.
The outage probability (38) can now be simplified to be
Pout ≈ Pr (Bq ≥ aL) (39)
where a = (1− α) 1|η|2 + αθ .
Since Bq approximates Bino (L, θ), the sparsity δ (and therefore the actual DoF L) determines
the distribution of Eve’s DoF Bq to observe the main channel. From (39), we can see that when
the α-backoff strategy is used, the correlation coefficient η determines how fast the threshold aL
deviates from θL (the mean of Bq) as α decreases. Note that in (39), the SNR (or equivalently,
power P ) does not appear in the formula. This is because the key rate is proportional to ergodic
key rate Ier(γ), which is a quadratic function of γ in the wideband regime (cf. (32)), and thus
cancels the γ2 in (38).
We next use results from large deviation theory [43] to upper bound the tail probability of
binomial distribution.
Lemma 5. [43, Theorem 1] Let Sn be a binomial random variable Bino (n, p). For p < a < 1,
and for n = 1, 2, 3, · · · , then
Pr(Sn ≥ an) ≤ 2−nD(a‖p) (40)
where
D(a‖p) ≡ a log a
p
+ (1− a) log (1− a)
1− p (41)
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the probability distributions Bern (a) and Bern (p).
By this lemma, the outage probability is upper bounded as
Pout ≤ 2−LD(a‖θ) . (42)
Figure 5 plots the numerical results of the secrecy outage exponent LD(a‖θ) in the wideband
regime. It shows that when the α-backoff strategy is used, the mechanism through which the
channel sparsity impacts the outage probability differs from how the channel sparsity impacts
the ergodic secret key rate. A richer channel (larger δ) always has larger exponent than a sparser
channel. In contrast, Figure 3 demonstrates a sparser channel yields a higher ergodic secret key
rate in the wideband regime.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study a setting in which two users desire to distill a common secret key
based on the inherent randomness of a reciprocal wireless channel. Our particular interest is
the effect of channel sparsity (e.g., in delay), which scales sub-linearly in signal bandwidth, on
secret key generation. Channel sparsity affects the inherent randomness of the main channel and
increases eavesdropper’s observability of the main channel. Since channel sparsity is an important
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Fig. 5. Plot of outage exponent LD(a‖θ) vs. bandwidth W . Other parameters include the maximum delay spread τmax = 100ns,
the conditional probability of overlap in Sab and Se is θ = 0.5 and the correlation between channel coefficients is η = 0.1.
The sparsity parameter δ is plotted for various values between 0.5 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
characteristic of many real-world wireless channels and since it has such a large impact on secret
key capacity, it is crucial to understand this interplay fully. This will help us to deliver secure
communication systems with robust guarantees.
We first consider the ergodic setting. In this setting, at each SNR there is an adequate bandwidth
to maximizes the ergodic secret key rate. Moreover, when a white sounding sequence is adopted
in the wideband (low-SNR) regime, a higher secret key rate can be achieved by a sparser channel.
For channels whose sparsity changes relatively slowly, a secrecy outage measure of perfor-
mance is adopted. If the key rate is a fraction α of the ergodic capacity, we show that richer
channels always have larger exponents characterizing the decay of the outage probability. This
result illustrates that a larger number of DoF can smooth out of the detrimental effects of an
unknown eavesdropper state.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Apply the results in [1], [2] where, respectively, (Xn, Sab) are Alice’s, (Y n, Sab) are Bob’s,
and (Zn, Se) are Eve’s observations. A lower bound on the ergodic capacity is (see [1, Theorem
1], [2, Theorem 3])
C−er =
1
n
[
I(Xn, Sab; Y
n, Sab)− I(Xn, Sab;Zn, Se)
]
.
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Using the chain rule and memoryless nature of the source model in (7) and (8), the first term
can be reduced to
I(Xn, Sab; Y
n, Sab)
= I(Sab; Y
n, Sab) + I(X
n; Y n, Sab|Sab)
= H(Sab) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y
n|X i−1, Sab)
(a)
= H(Sab) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Yi|Sab)
= H(Sab) + nI(X ; Y |Sab) ,
where (a) follows by applying the memoryless property to source (Xi, Yi). Similarly, the second
term reduces to
I(Xn, Sab;Z
n, Se)
= I(Sab;Z
n, Se) + I(X
n;Zn, Se|Sab)
(b)
= I(Sab;Se) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Z
n, Se|X i−1, Sab)
= I(Sab;Se) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Zi, Se|Sab)
= I(Sab;Se) + nI(X ;Z, Se|Sab) ,
where (b) is due to the Markov chain Sab−Se−Zn and applying chain rule on the second term.
Thus, the lower bound is
C−er = I(X ; Y |Sab)− I(X ;Z, Se|Sab) +
1
n
H(Sab|Se) . (43)
The upper bound is the conditional mutual information (see [1, Theorem 1], [2, Corollary 1]):
C+er =
1
n
I(Xn, Sab; Y
n, Sab|Zn, Se)
=
1
n
(
I(Sab; Y
n, Sab|Zn, Se)
+ I(Xn; Y n, Sab|Zn, Se, Sab)
)
≤ 1
n
(
H(Sab|Zn, Se)
+
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y
n|X i−1, Zn, Se, Sab)
)
(c)
=
1
n
(
H(Sab|Se) +
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Yi|Zi, Se, Sab)
)
= I(X ; Y |Z, Sab, Se) + 1
n
H(Sab|Se) ,
where (c) follows by Markov condition Sab − Se − Zn and the memoryless property.
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B. Derivation of mutual information (20)
First consider I(X;Y |Sab):
I(X;Y |Sab) = E[h(X|Sab)− h(Y |Sab)− h(X,Y |Sab)]
= E
[
log
(
det(RX) · det(RY )
det(RXY )
)]
, (44)
where h(X) is the differential entropy [44] of X , and the expectation is taken over the distri-
bution of Sab. Let RX denote the covariance matrix of X when the input Sab = S is fixed,
i.e.,
RX = E[XX
H |S] = DRhDH + σ21IK ,
where Rh = diag(ν21 , · · · , ν2L) and ν2ℓ = 0 if Sℓ = 0. Similarly,
RY = DRhD
H + σ22IN
RXY =
[
RX DRhD
H
DRhD
H
RY
]
.
We simplify the determinants as follows,
det(RX) = det(DRhD
H + σ21IN)
= (σ21)
N det
(
IN +
DRhD
H
σ21
)
(a)
= (σ21)
N det
(
IL +
ΛDHDΛ
σ21
)
(b)
= (σ21)
N
L∏
ℓ=1
(
1 +
P
σ21
ν2ℓ
)
= (σ21)
N
∏
ℓ:Sℓ=1
(
1 +
P
σ21
ν2ℓ
)
,
where (a) follows by defining Λ =
√
Rh and applying Sylvester’s determinant formula: det(Im+
AB) = det(In +BA) where A is an m-by-n matrix, and B is an n-by-m matrix. Step (b) is
due to (2). Similarly, we find that
det(RX)
.
= (σ22)
N
∏
ℓ:Sℓ=1
(
1 +
P
σ22
ν2ℓ
)
det(RXY )
.
= (σ21σ
2
2)
N
∏
ℓ:Sℓ=1
(
1 +
(σ21 + σ
2
2)P
σ21σ
2
2
ν2ℓ
)
.
Substituting into (44), we get (20a).
Follow a similar calculation, we get I(X;Z,Se|Sab) in (20b) by noting that
RXZ =
[
RX DRhh˜D
H
DR
hh˜
D
H
RZ
]
.
where R
hh˜
is a diagonal matrix and its ℓ-th diagonal element is equal to ην2ℓ if Qℓ = 1 or is
equal to zero if Qℓ = 0.
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C. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof is similar to [10, Theorem 4]. First note that Is(γ) is non-decreasing in γ and
so is Ier(γ). This can be verified by evaluating ∂Is(γ)∂γ , which is non-negative. Define I¯er(γ) =
max0<λ≤1 λIer
(
γ
λ
)
. Note that I¯er(γ) is a concave and non-decreasing function of γ. We are going
to show I¯er
(
P
σ2
)
is equal to Rer
(
P
σ2
)
defined in (29) over the average power constraint P . Let
P be the set of all sounding policies satisfying average power constraint P . Specifically, let
the sounding policy in P allocate power Ps to sounding signals with probability p(s) such that
E[Ps] =
∑
s p(s)Ps ≤ P . Note that Rer
(
P
σ2
) ≥ I¯er ( Pσ2 ). We can also upper bound
Rer
(
P
σ2
)
= max
P
∑
s
p(s)Ier
(
Ps
σ2
)
≤ max
P
∑
s
p(s)
[
max
0<λ≤1
λIer
(
Ps
λσ2
)]
= max
P
∑
s
p(s)I¯er
(
Ps
σ2
)
(a)
≤ max
P
I¯er
(∑
s p(s)Ps
σ2
)
(b)
≤ I¯er
(
P
σ2
)
,
where (a) and (b) are due to the concavity and non-decreasing function of I¯er(γ).
D. Proof of Theorem 4
We first show the lower bound and then the upper bound.
1) Lower bound (35):
I(K;Zn,Φ|sab, se)
= H(K|sab, se)−H(K|Zn,Φ, sab, se)
= H(K|sab, se)− [H(K,Φ|Zn, sab, se)−H(Φ|Zn, sab, se)]
(a)
≥ H(K|sab, se) +H(Φ|Y n, sab, se)
− [H(Xn, K,Φ|Zn, sab, se)−H(Xn|K,Φ, Zn, sab, se)]
(b)
≥ n(R − ǫ) +H(Φ|Y n, sab, se)−H(Xn|Zn, sab, se)
= n(R − ǫ) +H(Φ|Y n, sab, se)−H(Xn|Y n, sab, se)
+H(Xn|Y n, sab, se)−H(Xn|Zn, sab, se)
(c)
= n(R− ǫ)−H(Xn|Φ, Y n, sab, se)− nCs(sab, se)
(d)
≥ n(R− Cs(sab, se)− 2ǫ) ,
where (a) is due to the fact that given (sab, se), Φ−Xn− Y n−Zn form a Markov chain. Thus
H(Φ|Zn, sab, se) ≥ H(Φ|Y n, sab, se). (b) holds because entropy is non-negative and (K,Φ)
is function of (Xn, sab), we can take K,Φ away from H(Xn, K,Φ|Zn, sab, se). For the same
reason, we can add Φ in H(Xn|Y n, sab, se) and use chain rule to get (c). (d) is due to the
reliable condition Pr(Xn 6= f2(Y n, sab,Φ))→ 0 by applying Fano’s inequality [44].
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2) Upper bound (36):
I(K;Zn,Φ|sab, se)
= H(K|sab, se)−H(K|Zn,Φ, sab, se)
(a)
≤ nR−H(K|Zn,Φ, sab, se)
because K ∈ [1 : 2nR]. We need to show there exist a coding scheme such that
1
n
H(K|Zn,Φ, sab, se) ≥ Cs(sab, se)− 2ǫ . (45)
We will use the following lemma in the proof.
Lemma 6. (cf. [45, eq.(25)] [11, eq.(16)]) Any ǫ > 0, if 1
n
H(Φ|sab, se) ≥ H(X|Y, sab) + ǫ,
there exists a coding scheme where f2(·) and f3(·) are the decoding functions at Bob and Eve,
respectively, such that for sufficiently large n,
(i) Pr(Xn 6= f2(Y n, sab,Φ))→ 0 ,
(ii) 1
n
H(Xn|K,Φ, Zn, sab, se) ≤ ǫ .
The proof of Lemma 6 uses a random coding technique to show existence. The first statement
is exactly the Slepian-Wolf theorem [46]. The second statement is the standard equivocation
analysis which says if Eve knows K and Φ along with her observation Zn, she can recover
sequence Xn. We refer to [11, 45] for the details.
Adopting the coding scheme in Lemma 6 where the public message Φ ∈ [1 : 2n(H(X|Y,sab)+ǫ)].
We prove (45) through a sequence of (in)equalities:
H(K|Φ, Zn, sab, se)
= H(Xn, K|Φ, Zn, sab, se)−H(Xn|K,Φ, Zn, sab, se)
(a)
≥ H(Xn, K|Φ, Zn, sab, se)− nǫ
= H(Xn, K,Φ|Zn, sab, se)−H(Φ|Zn, sab, se)− nǫ
(b)
= H(Xn|Zn, sab, se)−H(Φ|Zn, sab, se)− nǫ
≥ H(Xn|Zn, sab, se)−H(Φ)− nǫ
(c)
≥ H(Xn|Zn, sab, se)− nH(X|Y, sab)− 2nǫ
= n(H(X|Z, sab, se)−H(X|Y, sab)− 2ǫ)
= n(Cs(sab, se)− 2ǫ) ,
where (a) is due to (ii) of Lemma 6. (b) follows because (K,Φ) is a function of (Xn, sab).
(c) comes from the fact that Φ ∈ [1 : 2n(H(X|Y,sab)+ǫ)] and the entropy is upper bounded by a
uniform distribution. This completes the proof.
REFERENCES
[1] R. Ahlswede and I. Csisza´r, “Common randomness in information theory and cryptography part I: Secret
sharing,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1121–1132, 1993.
[2] U. M. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information,” Information Theory,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 733–742, 1993.
21
[3] A. Khisti, S. Diggavi, and G. Wornell, “Secret-key generation with correlated sources and noisy channels,” in
Proc. Int. Symp. Inform. Theory, pp. 1005–1009, July 2008.
[4] V. Prabhakaran, K. Eswaran, and K. Ramchandran, “Secrecy via sources and channels – a secret key-secret
message rate tradeoff region,” in Proc. Int. Symp. Inform. Theory, pp. 1010–1014, July 2008.
[5] A. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” The Bell Systems Technical Journal, vol. 54, pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[6] Y. Chen and A. Han Vinck, “Wiretap channel with side information,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 54, pp. 395–402, Jan. 2008.
[7] W. Liu and B. Chen, “Wiretap channel with two-sided channel state information,” in Proc. Asilomar Conf.
Signals, Systems and Computers, 2007, pp. 893–897, Nov. 2007.
[8] A. Khisti, S. Diggavi, and G. Wornell, “Secret key agreement using asymmetry in channel state knowledge,”
in Proc. Int. Symp. Inform. Theory, pp. 2286–2290, 2009.
[9] A. Khisti, S. Diggavi, and G. Wornell, “Secret-key agreement with channel state information at the transmitter.”
arXiv:1009.3052.
[10] T. Chou, S. Draper, and A. Sayeed, “Key generation using external source excitation: Capacity, reliability, and
secrecy exponent,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 58, pp. 2455–2474, Apr. 2012.
[11] T. Chou, V. Tan, and S. Draper, “The sender-excited secret key agreement model: Capacity theorems,” in
Proc. Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, 2011.
[12] A. A. Hassan, W. E. Stark, J. E. Hersheyc, and S. Chennakeshu, “Cryptographic key agreement for mobile
radio,” Digital Signal Processing, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 207–212, 1996.
[13] R. Wilson, D. Tse, and R. A. Scholtz, “Channel identification: Secret sharing using reciprocity in ultrawideband
channels,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 364–375, 2007.
[14] C. Ye, A. Reznik, G. Sternberg, and Y. Shah, “On the secrecy capabilities of ITU channels,” pp. 2030–2034,
Oct. 2007.
[15] C. Ye, S. Mathur, A. Reznik, Y. Shah, W. Trappe, and N. Mandayam, “Information-theoretically secret key
generation for fading wireless channels,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 5,
pp. 240–254, June 2010.
[16] M. A. J. Jon W. Wallace, Chan Chen, “Key generation exploiting MIMO channel evolution: Algorithms and
theoretical limits,” March 2009.
[17] N. Patwari, J. Croft, S. Jana, and S. K. Kasera, “High-rate uncorrelated bit extraction for shared secret key
generation from channel measurements,” Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 9, pp. 17–30, Jan.
2010.
[18] T. Aono, K. Higuchi, T. Ohira, B. Komiyama, and H. Sasaoka, “Wireless secret key generation exploiting
reactance-domain scalar response of multipath fading channels,” Antennas and Propagation, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 53, pp. 3776–3784, Nov. 2005.
[19] A. Sayeed and A. Perrig, “Secure wireless communications: Secret keys through multipath,” in ICASSP 2008.
IEEE International Conference on, pp. 3013–3016, 2008.
[20] A. Molisch, “Ultrawideband propagation channels-theory, measurement, and modeling,” Vehicular Technology,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 54, pp. 1528–1545, sept. 2005.
[21] S. Ghassemzadeh, R. Jana, C. Rice, W. Turin, and V. Tarokh, “Measurement and modeling of an ultra-wide
bandwidth indoor channel,” Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 52, pp. 1786–1796, Oct. 2004.
[22] Z. Yan, M. Herdin, A. M. Sayeed, and E. Bonek, “Experimental study of MIMO channel statistics and capacity
via the virtual channel representation,” University of Wisconsin-Madison, Tech. Rep., Feb. 2007.
[23] N. Czink, X. Yin, H. Ozcelik, M. Herdin, E. Bonek, and B. H. Fleury, “Cluster characteristics in a MIMO
indoor propagation environment,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 6, pp. 1465–1475, Apr. 2007.
[24] A. Sayeed, “Sparse multipath wireless channels: Modeling and implications,” in Proc. ASAP, 2006.
[25] W. Bajwa, A. Sayeed, and R. Nowak, “Sparse multipath channels: Modeling and estimation,” in Digital Signal
Processing Workshop, pp. 320–325, Jan. 2009.
[26] W. Bajwa, J. Haupt, A. Sayeed, and R. Nowak, “Compressed channel sensing: A new approach to estimating
sparse multipath channels,” Proc. IEEE (special issue on Sparse Signal Processing), June 2010.
[27] W. Lee, “Effects on correlation between two mobile radio base-station antennas,” Communications, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 21, pp. 1214–1224, Nov. 1973.
[28] X. Tang, R. Liu, P. Spasojevic, and H. Poor, “On the throughput of secure hybrid-ARQ protocols for gaussian
block-fading channels,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 55, pp. 1575–1591, April 2009.
[29] O. Gungor, J. Tan, C. Emre Koksal, H. El Gamal, and N. B. Shroff, “Secrecy Outage Capacity of Fading
22
Channels,” arXiv:1112.2791, Dec. 2011.
[30] A. Sayeed and V. Raghavan, “Maximizing MIMO capacity in sparse multipath with reconfigurable antenna
arrays,” IEEE Journal on Special Topics in Signal Processing (special issue on Adaptive Waveform Design
for Agile Sensing and Communication), pp. 156–166, June 2007.
[31] S. Cotter and B. Rao, “Sparse channel estimation via matching pursuit with application to equalization,”
Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 50, pp. 374–377, Mar 2002.
[32] C. Carbonelli, S. Vedantam, and U. Mitra, “Sparse channel estimation with zero tap detection,” Wireless
Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 6, pp. 1743–1763, May 2007.
[33] W. Li and J. Preisig, “Estimation of rapidly time-varying sparse channels,” Oceanic Engineering, IEEE Journal
of, vol. 32, pp. 927–939, Oct. 2007.
[34] V. Raghavan, G. Hariharan, and A. Sayeed, “Capacity of sparse multipath channels in the ultra-wideband
regime,” IEEE Journal on Special Topics in Signal Processing (special issue on Performance Limits of Ultra-
Wideband Systems), pp. 156–166, June 2007.
[35] V. Raghavan and A. Sayeed, “Sublinear capacity scaling laws for sparse MIMO channels,” Information Theory,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 57, pp. 345–364, Jan. 2011.
[36] A. M. Sayeed and T. Sivanadyan, “Wireless communication and sensing in multipath environments using
multi-antenna transceivers,” in Handbook on Array Processing and Sensor Networks, Ch.5, Wiley-IEEE Press,
2010.
[37] M. K. Simon, J. K. Omura, R. A. Scholtz, and B. K. Levitt, Spread Spectrum Communications Handbook.
McGraw-Hill, 1994.
[38] J. Proakis, Digital Communications. McGraw-Hill, Aug. 2000.
[39] A. Goldsmith, Wireless Communications. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[40] A. Fletcher, S. Rangan, and V. Goyal, “Necessary and sufficient conditions for sparsity pattern recovery,”
Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 55, pp. 5758–5772, dec. 2009.
[41] T. Chou, S. Draper, and A. Sayeed, “Impact of channel sparsity and correlated eavesdropping on secret key
generation from multipath channel randomness,” in Proc. Int. Symp. Inform. Theory, 2010.
[42] E. L. Grab and I. R. Savage, “Tables of the expected value of 1/X for positive Bernoulli and Poisson variables,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 49, pp. 169–177, Mar. 1954.
[43] R. Arratia and L. Gordon, “Tutorial on large deviations for the binomial distribution,” Bulletin of Mathematical
Biology, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 125–131, 1989.
[44] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory. Wiley series in telecommunications, New
York: Wiley, 2nd ed., 2006.
[45] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, 1978.
[46] D. Slepian and J. Wolf, “Noiseless coding of correlated information sources,” Information Theory, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 19, pp. 471–480, Jul 1973.
